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Cars that automate most or all driving functions have drawn a great deal of 
recent publicity.  They are touted as bringing increased safety and convenience 
for drivers.  They may help drowsy drivers, inebriated drivers, or drivers with 
poor abilities to estimate distances.  They may allow drivers to multi-task, 
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answering phone calls, replying to emails or even watching movies as they are 
cruising along. They may extend driving capability to a range of new drivers, 
particularly those with mobility impairments but potentially also those with 
many other disabilities including sensory and cognitive limitations. In sum, these 
cars hold the potential of exciting new possibilities for people with disabilities, 
the elderly, and perhaps even children to transport themselves rather than being 
dependent on family, friends, or the vagaries1 of public transit. On the other hand, 
these cars will bring a range of new challenges, from ethical questions about how 
they are to be programmed, to regulatory questions about safety and liability for 
the inevitable accidents in which they may be involved.  
Much of the publicity characterizes automated vehicles as a novel, 
disruptive technology.  However, cars that automate driving functions can also 
be viewed in the context of an evolving range of mobility assistance mechanisms, 
from the earliest wheeled individual transport device pictured on a Greek vase, 
to the variety of invalid chairs invented from the sixteenth through the nineteenth 
centuries, to contemporary racing and motorized wheelchairs. Discussions of 
these vehicles often note their potential importance to people with disabilities. 
For example, in guidance issued in the fall of 2017, the National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration (“NHTSA”) observes: “automated vehicles may also 
provide new mobility options to millions more Americans. Today there are 49 
million Americans over age sixty-five and 53 million people have some form of 
disability.”2 As is typical of these observations, however, the NHTSA only 
mentions people with disabilities as possible users of these vehicles; nowhere 
does it consider some of the legal horizons that might open—or close—if the 
benefits of these vehicles for people with disabilities are taken seriously.  
This Article explores automated vehicles as a new form of mobility 
assistance for people with disabilities. It then considers how this classification 
might have different implications for the application of disability anti-
discrimination law to these cars.  Part of this inquiry requires consideration of 
the extent to which self-driving cars pose novel questions of tort liability both 
with regard to the right to be in the world and with regard to the possibility of 
 
 1. The use of the word “vagaries” is drawn from my favorite image of equality drawn by Richard 
Titmuss: whether he or a young West Indian went first for radiation treatment of their deadly cancers 
depended on “the vagaries of the London traffic.” But my use is ironic: all too frequently people with 
disabilities find public transit unavailing at all. RICHARD M. TITMUSS, SOCIAL POLICY: AN INTRODUCTION 
151 (Brian Abel-Smith & Kay Titmuss eds. 1974). 
 2. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Automated Vehicles for Safety (last visited Oct. 
12, 2017), https://www.nhtsa.gov/technology-innovation/automated-vehicles [herinafter NHTSA, 
AUTOMATED VEHICLES]. See generally HENRY CLAYPOOL ET AL., Self-Driving Cars: The Impact on 
People with Disabilities, RUDERMAN FAMILY FOUND.(Jan. 2017) (which estimates that two million people 
might be able to enter employment once automated vehicles become a realistic possibility), 
http://rudermanfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/Self-Driving-Cars-The-Impact-on-People-
with-Disabilities_FINAL.pdf.  
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3370520 
FVFORMATTED1 (DO NOT DELETE) 7/12/2018  5:07 PM 
2018] DISABILITY AND AUTOMATION 231 
new risks to others.  Another part of the inquiry requires examination of the 
privacy issues these devices may raise. 
But first, a word about terminology. Cars that automate most or all driving 
functions have been popularly characterized as “self-driving” cars.  More 
formally, they also have been called “autonomous” vehicles.3  These 
characterizations are misleading, for several reasons.  First, these vehicles may 
be automated in different degrees and in different ways.4 The 2017 NHTSA 
guidance treats these vehicles as on a continuum, from vehicles in which the 
human driver is assisted by advanced driver systems to a level of automation in 
which no human driver is involved at all.5  For example, various functions such 
as braking or turning may be programmed to intercede in case of human failure, 
to function automatically but be subject to overrides by physical touching or by 
voice, or to function entirely automatically.  As with currently available cars, 
functions such as cruise control or parking assist may be automated while other 
functions are not. Most moving functions might be automated—braking, 
steering, accelerating, changing direction—while other functions such as 
starting, turning off, exiting, or entering the vehicle might not be. Second, the 
use of terms such as “self-driving” or “autonomous” suggest degrees of control 
that are inaccurate and conceptually confused.  Automated cars do not have 
selves and they are not independent of design. They do not exercise the kind of 
self-government that is attributed to persons with autonomy.  Rather, they are 
designed with automated functions using programmed software.  They may be 
designed to take advantage of available machine learning techniques, but this too 
is a design choice.  Third, these cars likely will not function as independent 
entities but as part of a system of automated vehicles that reduce crash risks by 
how they behave as well as by how they communicate with one another.6 They 
thus should be thought of as vehicles that are automated to different extents and 
in different ways, not as people-like cars.  
 
 3. See generally, S. W., Why Autonomous and Self-Driving Cars Are Not the Same, ECONOMIST 
(July 2, 2017) (explaining the difference between self-driving and autonomous). 
 4. See, e.g., Travis J. Crayton & Benjamin Mason Meier, Autonomous Vehicles: Developing a 
Public Health Research Agenda to Frame the Future of Transportation Policy, J. TRANS. & HEALTH 
(Apr. 26, 2017). 
 5. NHTSA, AUTOMATED VEHICLES, supra note 2.  
 6. See generally, Mark Geistfeld, A Roadmap for Autonomous Vehicles: State Tort Liability, 
Automobile Insurance, and Federal Safety Regulation, 105 CALIF. L. REV. (Dec. 01, 2017), 
https://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4381&context=californialawreview 
(demonstrating the importance of considering system design for automated vehicles). 
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I. MOBILITY ASSISTANCE: FROM WHEELCHAIRS TO SELF-DRIVING 
CARS 
Wheeled forms of personal transit have been in existence since ancient 
times.7 They have gradually been improved in ways that permit increased ease 
and independent use. A wheelchair pushed by others was invented for Philip II 
of Spain in 1595. A German watchmaker, Philip Farfler, designed a self-
propelled three-wheeled chair for his own use in 1655.  The cumbersome Bath 
chair for invalids, named after that British spa town, was in vogue during the 
early part of the nineteenth century. Wheel rims allowing easy self-propulsion 
were invented in 1881 and the first motorized chair was manufactured in London 
in 1916. 
The return of disabled veterans from World War II spurred development of 
mobility devices.  George Klein and a team of Canadian engineers invented an 
electric powered chair for veterans.8  The Paralympic movement grew after 
World War II, with the first official Paralympic Games held in partnership with 
the Olympic Games in 1960.9 There are now many wheelchair sports, including 
basketball and athletics.  The first sport for power chair users, power chair soccer, 
has now been played for over twenty years.10  These sports all have specific rules 
for mobility assistance devices aimed to promote goals such as inclusion, 
exciting action, fairness, and the safety of participants. Their existence has 
contributed greatly to the development of wheelchair and mobility assistance 
design. 
In addition, ongoing work in neuroscience promises to open up stunning 
new possibilities for mobility control.  Neuroscientists have been developing 
precise understandings of the connections between areas of the brain and 
mobility of specific body parts.11 Technology companies are developing 
implantable chips to allow individuals who are paralyzed to exercise control over 
bodily movements.12  The day may not be far off when people who are 
 
 7. Rachel Anderson, History of the Wheelchair, ABILITY TOOLS WKLY. (Oct. 11, 2013), 
https://abilitytools.org/blog/history-of-the-wheelchair/; see also Mary Bellis, History of the Wheelchair, 
THOUGHTCO. (last updated Apr. 13, 2017), https://www.thoughtco.com/history-of-the-wheelchair-
1992670. The historical claims in this paragraph are drawn from Bellis. 
 8. Steve Wynler, George Klein and the Electric Wheelchair, WHEELCHAIR REV. 
http://www.wheelchair-review.co.uk/wheelchair-information/electric-wheelchairs/2/george-klein-
electric-wheelchair.php (last visited Mar. 10, 2018). 
 9. INTERNATIONAL PARALYMPIC COMMITTEE, PARALYMPICS—HISTORY OF THE MOVEMENT, 
https://www.paralympic.org/the-ipc/history-of-the-movement (last visited Nov. 30, 2017). 
 10. WHEELCHAIR SPORTS FEDERATION, POWERCHAIR SOCCER BLOG (June 28, 2009 7:52 PM), 
http://www.wheelchairsportsfederation.org/adaptive-sports/powerchair-soccer. 
 11. E.g., Carey Y. Zhang et al., Partially Mixed Selectivity in Human Posterior Parietal Association 
Cortex 95 NEURON 697, 697–708 (2017). 
 12. E.g., Press Release, BLACKROCK MICROSYSTEMS, Hacking the Neural Code Responsible for 
Movement (Aug. 17, 2017), http://blackrockmicro.com/hacking-the-neural-code-responsible-for-
movement/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2017). 
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quadriplegic will be able to drive their wheelchairs or move their limbs by how 
they think.   
It is not a great step to imagine driving a car in this way, too. After all, a car 
is just a mobility device that provides drivers with certain advantages: shelter 
from the weather, a hard shell for protection in the case of contact with others on 
the road, and possibilities for impressive speed. So perhaps it is not so great a 
step to a car that automates many driving functions, too.   The driver might select 
among preprogrammed driving options, just as drivers today choose whether 
they want to drive cars featuring four-wheel drive, high clearance, quick 
acceleration, or a tight turning radius.  The driver might choose a vehicle 
programmed for caution (never exceed the speed limit), or risk (go up to ten 
miles over the speed limit), or programmed to prefer driving off the road to 
hitting a pedestrian in it. The driver might also opt for various override 
capabilities activated by voice, puffs of air, or even blinks of an eye.  The design 
possibilities are enormous—and have implications for how people with 
disabilities may be able to use these vehicles and how the law might apply when 
they do so. 
These developments open remarkable new possibilities of mobility 
assistance for people with disabilities and people who have difficulty driving. To 
take just one example, persons who have seizures typically are not permitted to 
drive until they can demonstrate that their seizures are under full control.13 This 
restriction can make it very difficult for these persons to get to work, school, 
medical appointments, or other activities in the community. It might not be 
difficult to program a car so to select a route limited to roads with safe turnoff 
options; roads with these options might become more common as use of 
automated cars increased.  The car might also be linked to sensors on the driver 
that could detect when a seizure is imminent and programmed to take the safe 
turnoff option and signal for help if needed.  The availability of this option might 
permit people with seizure disorders to drive safely even when they have not yet 
been able to demonstrate full seizure control.  
Much of the initial commentary treats these vehicles as raising novel legal 
and ethical questions that may present barriers to their adoption.14 Some of these 
legal barriers are clear in current law, such as the definition of “driver” as a 
human person in the Vienna Convention on Road Traffic of 1968.15 Some of the 
ethical issues are raised by “trolley problem” cases, in which a vehicle is hurtling 
 
 13. EPILEPSY FOUNDATION, STATE DRIVING LAWS DATABASE (2017), 
http://www.epilepsy.com/driving-laws/2008826.  
 14. For an initial effort to outline some of these issues in a primarily European context, see Heather 
Bradshaw-Martin & Catherine Easton, Autonomous or ‘Driverless’ Cars and Disability: A Legal and 
Ethical Analysis 20 EUROPEAN J. CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES (2014), 
http://webjcli.org/article/view/344/471.  
 15. Vienna Convention on Road Traffic. 1968. Art. 8(1). 
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towards a group of people who can only be saved if it is diverted towards another 
(typically smaller) group; here, the question is whether the vehicle should be 
programmed to make the swerve.16 Another variant of this problem for 
automated vehicles is whether they should be programmed to prefer the safety of 
vehicle occupants over the safety of others using roadways or sidewalks. 
Responding to these potential issues, several writers have recently considered 
how tort and insurance law might reasonably take these vehicles into account.17 
Despite the recognition that these vehicles might be particularly useful for 
people with disabilities, little of the recent commentary has specifically 
addressed legal issues that might be raised when drivers with disabilities seek to 
use automated vehicles.18  This Article makes a start in remedying this significant 
omission.  I begin with the prohibition on disability discrimination in 
employment in the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).  Many workers 
have found that driving restrictions impede their ability to work even with 
accommodations; I consider whether the availability of automated vehicles may 
have implications for this problem. I then address issues about automated 
vehicles that may arise under Title II of the ADA, the public services title, 
including whether states that refuse to give driver’s licenses to persons with 
certain disabilities who use automated vehicles are discriminating on the basis of 
disability and whether states should be expected to design streets to take the 
needs of automated vehicles into account.  Then, I sketch some of the tort liability 
questions that may be raised when automated vehicles operated on behalf of 
people with disabilities are engaged in accidents.  Finally, I consider briefly some 
of the privacy questions that these vehicles raise, particularly as they relate to the 
ADA and tort liability. 
II. THE ADA AND EMPLOYMENT: AUTOMATED VEHICLES AS A 
REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION? 
The ADA prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of 
disability.19  It is discrimination to fail to make “reasonable accommodations to 
the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual 
 
 16. Several commentators have argued this problem will be solved by liability rules rather than by 
ethical rules (even though the liability rules may reflect ethical judgments).  See, e.g., Brian Casey, Amoral 
Machines, or: How Roboticists Can Learn to Stop Worrying and Love the Law, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 231 
(2017); Aarian Marshall, Lawyers, Not Ethicists, Will Solve the Robocar ‘Trolley Problem’, WIRED (May 
28, 2017), https://www.wired.com/2017/05/autonomous-vehicles-trolley-problem/.  
 17. For the most comprehensive discussion of this topic, see Geistfeld, supra note 6. 
 18. Exceptions are reports from several organizations with specific interests in disability rights. See, 
e.g., HENRY CLAYPOOL ET AL., supra note 2, at 32–33 (urging disability rights advocates to organize to 
encourage regulators to take into account the importance of these vehicles for people with disabilities); 
see also NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, SELF-DRIVING CARS: MAPPING ACCESS TO A TECHNOLOGY 
REVOLUTION (Nov. 2, 2015), 
https://www.ncd.gov/sites/default/files/NCD_AutomatedVehiclesReport_508-PDF.pdf. 
 19. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2008). 
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with a disability who is an applicant or employee, unless such covered entity can 
demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the 
operation of the business.”20 Reasonable accommodations are not required if the 
employee is not otherwise qualified; accommodations are not reasonable if they 
would not enable the employee to perform essential job functions21 or if they 
would impose an undue hardship on the employer.22 
Some jobs require employees to operate moving equipment such as 
forklifts, haulers, buses, trucks, or cars.  There are many reasons why employees 
might have difficulty with using this equipment.  Some of these difficulties could 
be physical:  an employee who has just had foot surgery might be unable to push 
the gas pedal on a car or sit for a significant period of time without elevating the 
foot.  Some are cognitive: an employee or prospective employee with limited 
cognitive skills may not be able to master tasks necessary to drive the vehicle or 
to make decisions required for its safe operation. Some could be both physical 
and cognitive.  For example, an employee with a seizure disorder may be unable 
to obtain a driving license without demonstrating that the disorder has been 
effectively controlled for a specified period of time.  An employee with 
monocular vision, although able to obtain an ordinary driving license, may be 
unable to obtain a specialized license necessary for driving certain types of heavy 
equipment.  These employees may lose or never obtain jobs because of their 
limitations.  
Take for example Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,23 a decision perhaps 
better known as part of the trilogy in which the Supreme Court severely curtailed 
who could count as “disabled” for purposes of the ADA.24 Kirkingburg was hired 
as a truck driver by Albertson’s.  At the time he was hired, he was required to 
take a physical examination that included an eye examination to determine 
whether he met federal Department of Transportation (“DOT”) standards for 
commercial truck drivers.  The examining physician erroneously certified that he 
met the standards.25  After Kirkingburg was injured on the job and took a leave 
of absence, he was required to undergo a further physical.  At that examination, 
the physician correctly determined that, due to amblyopia, Kirkingburg did not 
meet the relevant DOT standards.26  Kirkingburg applied for, and eventually 
received, a DOT waiver that was available to applicants with recent commercial 
driving experience who had not been involved in accidents or specified 
 
 20. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2008). 
 21. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8) (defining a qualified individual as one who with or without reasonable 
accommodation can perform essential job functions). 
 22. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5). 
 23. 527 U.S. 555 (1999). 
 24. The other two cases in the so-called “Sutton trilogy” were Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 
U.S. 471 (1999), and Murphy v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 527 U.S. 516 (1999). 
 25. 527 U.S. at 559. 
 26. Id. 
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violations.  In the meantime, however, Albertson’s fired him for failing to meet 
the DOT standards that, it contended, were reasonable job qualifications.27 The 
Court initially addressed whether Kirkingburg was disabled for the purpose of 
claiming the protections of the ADA. It held that his claim to be disabled should 
be assessed taking into account whether he had substantial functional limitations 
in light of how his perceptual abilities had been affected by his amblyopia28—a 
holding that was later specifically rejected by the ADA Amendments Act of 
2008.29  
The Kirkingburg Court then turned to Albertson’s contention that 
Kirkingburg was not qualified for the job, despite his having received a waiver 
from the DOT.  The ADA permits employers to set qualification standards that 
are job related and consistent with business necessity.30 Under this standard, 
Albertson’s claimed that it was simply applying the federal DOT standards. 
Kirkingburg argued that the ADA required the employer to make an 
individualized determination of whether he met or could meet the standard with 
reasonable accommodations such as by obtaining the waiver. He bolstered his 
argument with the structure of the ADA “direct threat” defense, which permits 
the employer to impose as a job qualification that “an individual shall not pose a 
direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals in the workplace”31 which 
“cannot be eliminated by reasonable accommodation.”32 Albertson’s reply was 
that determining whether a standard is job related and consistent with business 
necessity does not require an individualized assessment and that it was entitled 
to rely on the standard set by the DOT regulations. The Court accepted this reply, 
together with the contention that the waiver program was not an alteration of the 
basic safety standards, but a demonstration project designed to acquire evidence 
about whether a more individualized standard should be adopted.33 Albertson’s, 
the Court said, and was not required to join the government’s experiment or to 
justify on its own the government’s safety regulation.34 
There are many employees (or prospective employees) like Hallie 
Kirkingburg who lose employment because of their supposed inability to operate 
equipment.35 The most common issues in these cases are whether the operation 
 
 27. Id. at 560. 
 28. Id. at 566. 
 29. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 n.(a)(4). 
 30. Id. § 12113(a). 
 31. Id. § 12113(b). 
 32. Id. § 12113(3). 
 33. 527 U.S. at 574. 
 34. Id.at 577. 
 35. See Brown v. Smith, 827 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 2016) (question of fact whether possession of CDL 
is essential function of transit bus driver supervisor position); see also Mason v. United Parcel Service 
Co. Inc., 674 Fed. Appx. 943 (11th Cir. 2017) (employee with lifting restrictions not qualified as parcel 
truck driver); Jarvela v. Crete Carrier Corp., 776 F.2d 822 (11th Cir. 2015) (commercial truck driver with 
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of the vehicle is an essential function of the job, whether the employee is 
qualified for the position with or without accommodations, and whether the 
employer can raise the defenses of business necessity or direct threat.36   
If driving is an essential function of a position, and an employee cannot 
legally drive, the employee is not qualified for the position.  Much hinges, 
therefore, on the determination of whether driving is an essential job function.  
In many litigated cases, employees challenge their employer’s determination that 
driving is essential to the job in question.  Although courts give deference to 
employer’s judgments about job functions, the employer’s judgments are not 
conclusive.37 According to the EEOC, employers must evaluate positions in 
terms of the objectives to be accomplished in order to determine whether driving 
is required for their performance.38 The essential function inquiry is a factual 
inquiry, not a matter of law.39 Courts weigh a number of factors in determining 
what functions are essential, beyond the employer’s judgment and written job 
descriptions.  These include the amount of time spent performing the function, 
the consequences of not requiring the employee to perform the function, the work 
experience of past incumbents in the job, and the current work experience of 
others in similar jobs.40  For example, in upholding a judgment that a street 
supervisor for a bus company did not need to have the commercial driving license 
(“CDL”) required for actually driving buses, the Seventh Circuit noted that the 
employee had never had to drive a bus in the four years he had been a 
supervisor.41 Moreover, his supervisor had only had to drive a bus once in the 20 
years before that he had held the position. In a similar case, the Seventh Circuit 
reversed a summary judgment ruling in favor of the employer when a bus 
mechanic’s helper with vision and hearing impairments had never had to drive a 
bus in the twelve years he had held the position.42 In contrast, in upholding a 
grant of summary judgment for the employer that driving to visit customers was 
an essential function of a store manager responsible for customer relations, the 
 
diagnosis of current alcohol dependence not qualified); see also Coleman v. Pennsylvania State Police, 
561 Fed. Appx. 138 (3rd Cir. 2014) (probationary state trooper with seizure disorder direct threat to public 
safety); see also EEOC v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 424 F.2d 1060 (9th Cir. 2005) (parcel truck driver 
with monocular vision a direct threat to health and safety of others). 
 36. The direct threat defense is 42 U.S.C. §12113(b). Controversially, the Court has extended the 
defense to cover not only threats to others but also threats to self. Chevron, Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73 
(2002). 
 37. Hawkins v. Schwan Home Service, Inc., 778 F.3d 877 (10th Cir. 2015).  
 38. EEOC Office of Legal Counsel Staff Members, Informal Discussion Letter: ADA/Drivers 
License/Essential Functions/Reasonable Accommodation (June 21, 2006), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/letters/2006/ada_license_function_accommodation.html.  
 39. Brown v. Smith, 827 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 40. Iselin v. Bama Companies, Inc., 690 Fed. Appx. 593 (10th Cir. 2017); Wagner v. Sherwin-
Williams Co., 647 Fed. Appx. 645 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 41. Brown, 827 F.2d at 609. 
 42. Shell v. Smith, 789 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2015). 
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Sixth Circuit observed that the employee admitted that he spent an average of 
about a day’s work per week in making calls.43 
Accommodations may enable the employee who needs to be out on the road 
to perform the job successfully without driving herself. For some jobs, 
employees can reach remote sites by alternative means that may be reasonable 
accommodations.  For example, when Whitney Stephenson, a highly successful 
sales representative for Pfizer who became legally blind due to an optic nerve 
disorder, proposed that she be able to use a driver to reach clients, the Fourth 
Circuit held that it was a question of fact whether driving herself or travelling 
was the function essential to her job.44 Pfizer had not engaged in a discussion of 
whether hiring a driver was a reasonable accommodation for her, maintaining 
instead that driving herself was the essential job function, because there might 
be “significant increased risk and liability related to vehicular accidents, workers 
compensation, and misappropriation of and/or lost drug samples” if she used a 
driver rather than driving herself.45 Employers might seek to raise similar 
liability concerns if employees were to suggest automated driving functions as 
accommodations; however, whether they would succeed in light of how vehicles 
might be designed to meet these concerns will be an issue.46 
Even when employees can legally drive and thus are not legally unable to 
perform job functions that require driving, employers may insist on heightened 
safety standards as job related and a matter of business necessity.47 While a CDL 
is not required to drive small delivery trucks, for example, some employers may 
require that employees with ordinary licenses also meet the additional physical 
standards for a CDL due to concerns about tort liability. United Parcel (UPS) 
imposed this requirement on all parcel truck drivers, for example.  Deaf 
employees or potential employees of UPS who could not pass the “whisper test” 
portion of the CDL physical (which required that they be able to perceive a 
forced whispered voice in the better ear at not less than 5 feet, with or without a 
hearing aid) challenged the requirement as disability discrimination.48 These 
employees could meet all the other qualifications for parcel drivers, including 
possession of a valid state driver’s license and a safe driving record. The district 
court concluded, in a ruling originally affirmed by a panel of the 9th Circuit, that 
this requirement was not justified under the business necessity defense because 
UPS had not shown either that substantially all deaf employees presented a 
greater safety risk or that it would be too difficult to determine which ones did 
 
 43. Wagner, 747 Fed. App’x. at 645. 
 44. Stephenson v. Pfizer, Inc., 641 Fed. App’x. 214 (4th Cir. 2016) (unpublished). 
 45. Id. at 218. 
 46. For a discussion of tort liability, see infra Part IV. 
 47. 42 U.S.C. § 12113(a). 
 48. Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 465 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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not pose such a risk.49 The case was reheard en banc, however, and the Ninth 
Circuit remanded it to the district court for a determination of whether the 
employees were qualified in the sense of safe to drive a package truck (rather 
than safe to drive their own cars) and whether the employer had demonstrated 
the defense of business necessity under the proper standard.50 Safety features 
introduced through automation will be relevant to the determination in such cases 
of whether the employer’s job qualification is justified by business necessity. 
There may be cases in which the employer uses automated equipment for all 
employees as a way to reduce risks, just as warning sounds are ubiquitous when 
vehicles are in reverse. The employer in such cases will not be able to rely on the 
expense or similar concerns with the safety devices but will need to show that 
the additional employee qualification is a business necessity despite the 
protections the device offers for disabled and non-disabled drivers alike. 
Employers may also contend that the employee’s operation of machinery 
presents a direct threat to themselves or to others. A direct threat defense must 
be based on an individualized assessment of the employee’s condition. For 
example, a driver’s license examiner who had panic attacks due to PTSD was 
found to present a direct threat to the safety of others, including members of the 
public applying for licenses, because of the possibility that she might have a 
panic attack while testing applicants.51 Factors considered by the court in this 
assessment included the duration of the risk posed by her condition, the nature 
and severity of the potential harm, the likelihood of the harm, and the imminence 
of the harm.52 In such direct threat cases, the employer will need to show that the 
employee using automated functions as a disability accommodation poses risks 
to self or others—a demonstration that may become increasingly difficult as 
automated designs rely on machine learning. 
In sum, if drivers with disabilities have increased access to licenses because 
of the availability of automation, conflicts can be expected to arise over whether 
they are qualified for jobs that require driving or whether the employer can 
successfully mount a defense of business necessity or direct threat. The 
evidentiary questions treated by the court in the UPS case will be central to the 
business necessity defense:  is there reason to believe that these drivers overall 
present elevated safety risks? Or, if not, is there particular difficulty in separating 
out the drivers who may present elevated risks from those who may not?  These 
questions will be especially pressing as a matter of disability discrimination if 
drivers without disabilities routinely use automated devices and are permitted to 
 
 49. Id. at 1085. 
 50. Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.2d 975 (9th Cir 2007).  The district court had construed 
the employer’s business necessity defense too strongly, as requiring that the employer show a bona fide 
occupational qualification. 
 51. Felix v. Wis. Dep’t of Transp., 828 F.3d 546 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 52. Id. at 569. 
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do so by their employers. If so, the employer will need to argue that the evidence 
shows that disabled drivers using automation are less safe than abled drivers 
using automation, or that the safer drivers using automation cannot be 
distinguished from the unsafe drivers.  An additional problem for employers may 
be evidence that disabled drivers using automation are safer than non-disabled 
drivers who do not use automation, especially in job contexts where use of 
automation by non-disabled drivers is erratic. Employers who raise direct threat 
defenses will need to rely on individualized assessments of the safety of disabled 
drivers using automation. In Section IV below I will return to some of the 
evidence about safety and tort liability with automated vehicles and their users. 
III. THE ADA AND DISCRIMINATION IN PUBLIC SERVICES: 
AUTOMATED VEHICLES, QUALIFICATIONS FOR DRIVER’S 
LICENSES, AND MODIFICATIONS IN STREET DESIGN  
Under Title II of the ADA, public entities may not discriminate based on 
disability in the services they provide.53  Public entities include states, local 
governments, and their instrumentalities.54  Individuals with disabilities, 
however, must be qualified to meet the essential eligibility requirements for the 
service. 55 They may meet these requirements with reasonable modifications or, 
for communication, with auxiliary aids and services.56 As automated vehicles 
become increasingly available, this non-discrimination mandate arguably may 
require changes in licensing and in street design, to take just two public services 
particularly relevant to automated vehicles.   
It is well known that people with disabilities face difficulties in access to 
transportation services.  Lack of reliable and accessible transportation is a 
frequent explanation for the inability of people with disabilities to get to and from 
jobs, medical appointments, or myriad other important activities in the 
community.  Lack of transportation also creates barriers to civic participation 
such as voting or attending public meetings.57 The resulting social isolation is an 
important cause of mental health issues, particularly depression, among people 
with disabilities.58  Access to transportation may become even more problematic 
if, as some predict, transit officials become reluctant to invest in public transit 
out of concern that it soon will be supplanted by automated vehicles.59  
 
 53. 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1990). 
 54. Id. at § 12131(1). 
 55. Id. at § 12131(2). 
 56. Id.  
 57. HENRY CLAYPOOL ET AL., supra note 2, at 21 (estimating that up to three million people may 
have been unable to vote in 2012 because of the lack of accessible transportation). 
 58. Id. at 20–21.  
 59. See, e.g., NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 18, at 6; Lee Davidson, Will Self-
Driving Cars, Taxis Make Mass Transit Obsolete?, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Aug. 16, 2017), 
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A. Driver’s Licenses 
 The rules for acquiring driver’s licenses are set by state law.  The National 
Council on Disability (“NCD”) has proposed that once fully automated cars are 
available, “there is no reason for an occupant to be licensed at all.”60 This is an 
extreme claim, surely false for any cars that are less than fully automated and 
perhaps even problematic for cars that are fully automated. Even with fully 
automated cars, there may be reason to license to ensure that users are able to act 
responsibly with respect to questions such as who may be passengers in the 
vehicle, where the vehicle may be instructed to drive, or what route the vehicle 
might be instructed to take. The NCD has also pointed out that varying state 
regulations about licensure may be problematic when vehicles cross state lines, 
although states today do enforce different requirements based on the age of 
drivers.61 
Driver’s licenses, including commercial licenses, are public services for 
ADA purposes62 Public entities must administer the testing process and make 
licensing decisions in a manner that does not discriminate.  It is disability 
discrimination to fail to make reasonable modifications for people with 
disabilities during the testing process.63 In a number of cases, however, license 
applicants with disabilities have confronted requirements that were not imposed 
on non-disabled applicants; courts have upheld these requirements based on what 
were characterized as legitimate interests in public safety.  For example, when 
Stafford Coolbaugh and his wife moved from California to Louisiana, she was 
issued a Louisiana driver’s license based on her California license but he was 
not. Louisiana insisted he provide medical certification and take a road test in his 
own hand-controlled vehicle because they observed that he was paraplegic. The 
court held that Louisiana had acted reasonably to protect the public safety.64 
On the other hand, it would clearly be discriminatory for a licensing agency 




 60. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, supra note 18, at 6–7. 
 61. In New Jersey, the minimum age for an unrestricted license is eighteen; young drivers who move 
to New Jersey after being licensed elsewhere must still comply with the New Jersey requirements and 
cannot transfer their licenses. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, MOTOR VEHICLE COMMISSION, GDL DEFINITIONS, 
http://www.state.nj.us/mvc/Licenses/gdl_definitions.htm (last updated Mar. 13, 2017). Many states have 
enacted graduated driver’s license statutes; requirements vary and teens are expected to comply with the 
requirements of their state of licensure when they drive out of state. 
 62. Briggs v. Walker, 88 F.Supp.2d 1196 (D. Kan 2000). 
 63. Dunn v. La. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr., 2014 WL 1431469 (M.D. La. 2014) (not reported in 
F. Supp.3d) (describing discrimination to require spoken English rather than written English in a skills 
test for a CDL) 
 64. Coolbaugh v. La. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr., 136 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1998). Coolbaugh had 
used his California license for identification purposes only and did not have a hand-controlled vehicle in 
which to take the test.  See also Theriault v. Flynn, 162 F.3d 46 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3370520 
FVFORMATTED1 (DO NOT DELETE) 7/12/2018  5:07 PM 
242 JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY [VOL. 20:229 
standard way.  For example, it would be discrimination to refuse to grant a 
license to someone who used hand controls or elevated foot pedals to operate a 
vehicle both of which are reasonable modifications under the ADA regulations.65 
In its brochure about adapting motor vehicles for people with disabilities, the 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration lists the following features as 
possible ways to improve the comfort and safety of drivers with disabilities: high 
or wide doors, adjustable foot pedals, large interior door handles, oversized 
knobs with visible labels, support handles, large or adjustable size print for 
dashboard gauges, seat adjusters, and dashboard-mounted ignition.66 Notably, 
none of these adaptations include automated driving features. 
Whether automated driving features are different in kind from other vehicle 
adaptations is potentially an open question, however.  A variety of features that 
enable drivers who lack mobility to exercise control of vehicles are under design, 
including high-tech joysticks or voice activated controls.67 This equipment 
functions under real-time control of the driver who is expected to react to road 
conditions and give appropriate commands to the vehicle.  An alternative would 
be a vehicle that is programmed to react to road conditions in a manner that is 
automated. The vehicle might even be designed with override capabilities that 
could allow the driver to respond in real time—for example, by voice or by sip 
and puff activation. Suppose that one or more of these types of vehicle design 
are significantly safer, not only for people with disabilities but for everyone else 
who uses the vehicle as a driver.68 Analytically, it would seem that to fail to 
license a user of such a vehicle because the user has a disability would be 
disability discrimination, just as it is disability discrimination to fail to license a 
driver who drives a vehicle in a non-standard way that is readily available today. 
Instead, non-discrimination would require licensing the driver with conditions: 
to operate an automated vehicle that meets safety requirements appropriate to the 
disability in question. 
 
 65. C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(6)–(7). 
 66. NHTSA, ADAPTING MOTOR VEHICLES FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 11 (last revised June 
2015), https://one.nhtsa.gov/Driving-Safety/Disabled-
Drivers/disabled%E2%80%93drivers%E2%80%93and%E2%80%93passengers. 
 67. See, e.g., National Mobility Equipment Dealer’s Association, Advanced Driving Controls May 
Put You in the Driver’s Seat, DRIVERS WITH DISABILITIES BLOG (Nov. 4, 2011), 
https://www.nmeda.com/advanced-driving-controls-may-put-you-in-the-drivers-seat/; see, e.g., Drive-
MASTER TOTAL MOBILITY CENTER, HITECH DRIVING CONTROLS (2017), 
http://drivemastermobility.com/products/hi-tech-driving-controls/; see, e.g., Jaise Jose, Voice Guided 
Vehicle for Handicapped 35 INT’L J. COMPUTER APPLICATIONS (2011).  
 68. For a discussion of these safety questions, see infra Part IV. 
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B. Street Design  
 Since the Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, federally funded facilities 
must meet accessibility standards.69 This Act brought curb cuts into widespread 
use—one of the most universally lauded and beneficial achievements of the 
disability rights movement.  Since 1990, the ADA has required public entities to 
meet access standards; these include at a minimum compliance with the 
Architectural and Transportation Barriers Compliance Board design standards.70 
Most of the attention to accessibility has concerned buildings and pedestrian 
rights of way, as these are the facilities that it is assumed will be used by people 
with disabilities. But there is no reason why streets should not come under the 
same strictures. 
Construction standards differ for alterations and for new construction. 
Modifications of roads are alterations, which must meet the “maximum extent 
feasible” standard.71  Roads are modified over time, as new safety features, 
pavements, bicycle lanes, or pedestrian-traffic interfaces are constructed. If 
automated vehicles become increasingly available and usable by people with 
disabilities, it may be relevant to consider whether accessibility requirements 
should include features to facilitate their use. Examples might include turnouts 
or shoulders to allow automated vehicles to pull off the road and stop safely for 
users who are at risk of losing capacity as with a seizure. They might include 
signals that are programmed to communicate road information to automated 
vehicles and that are part of a system of automated vehicle management. Features 
of the existing roadway, such as width, grade, mature trees, or utility 
installations, may limit the feasibility of these changes.72 But there are many 
examples of streets that have been modified to allow new features such as 
dedicated bus or bicycle lanes that are at least as structurally significant as 
turnouts might be. 
Modifications in public programs are unreasonable to the extent that they 
involve fundamental alterations in program design.  It is fair to expect that public 
entities faced with expensive design requirements for automated vehicles might 
contend that these are fundamental alterations of providing and maintaining 
public streets for driving. Driving, it could be said, requires user-operation, so it 
is a fundamental alteration of streets to construct them for use of automated 
 
 69. 42 U.S.C. §§4151 (1968).  
 70. 42 U.S.C. § 12134(c) (1990). 




 72. Id. at ch. 2, https://www.access-board.gov/guidelines-and-standards/streets-sidewalks/public-
rights-of-way/guidance-and-research/accessible-public-rights-of-way-planning-and-design-for-
alterations/chapter-2%E2%80%94alterations. 
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vehicles.  This objection will gradually lose force, however, if driving itself 
increasingly becomes automated. When automated driving is commonplace—
which some predict may not be very far off—it will be untenable to contend that 
use of automated vehicles by people with disabilities is a fundamental alteration.  
Adjusting streets for automated driving may become like adjusting sidewalks for 
curb cuts: a set of changes implemented for disability access that are widely 
regarded as beneficial to all. 
Another area of concern about the use of automated vehicles generally, as 
well as by people with disabilities, is tort liability.  In theory, governmental 
entities might be subject to tort liability for issuing licenses or designing facilities 
that are unsafe. Governments can use sovereign immunity to protect themselves 
in whole or in part from tort liability. Even if governments do not choose to rely 
on immunity, they may also have an important role to play in assuring the safety 
of automated vehicle systems.  I now turn to these problems of tort liability, 
focusing on how they are raised when automated vehicles are used by persons 
with disabilities.  
IV. TORT LAW: DANGERS FROM AND DANGERS OF MOBILITY 
ASSISTANCE 
As a general matter, persons with disabilities have not fared well in tort law, 
particularly when they have been injured by others and are considered to have 
been contributorily negligent for not having exercised extra caution to protect 
themselves. This section considers how persons with disabilities might—and 
should—fare as users of automated vehicles involved in accidents.  
A. Disability Discrimination in Tort Law 
 
  In his pathbreaking law review article, “The Right to Live in the World: 
The Disabled in the Law of Torts,” Jacobus tenBroek73 detailed how tort law 
fails to protect people with disabilities from dangers constructed by others.  If a 
construction firm leaves an open hole, with no warning or barrier, and a visually 
impaired person is injured by falling in, tenBroek argued, a damages remedy 
should lie against the construction company.74  The failure to do so cuts squarely 
against policies of integrationism apparent in the Rehabilitation Act75 and other 
efforts to bring people with disabilities into the work force.  tenBroek wrote:  “If 
the disabled have the right to live in the world, they must have the right to make 
 
 73. Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 CAL. L. 
REV. 841 (1966). 
 74. Id. at 882. 
 75. In its present form, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93-110, 87 Stat. 355, 29 U.S.C. §§ 
701 et seq. 
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their way into it and therefore must be entitled to use the indispensable means of 
access, and to use them on terms that will make the original right effective.”76  
Negligence law protects people from conduct that subjects them to 
“unreasonable risk of harm,” judged both in light of the probability of the harm 
and its severity.77 Reasonableness is judged by the behavior of the person of 
ordinary prudence; but the problem is how prudence is to be defined in light of 
the circumstances of persons with disability.78  If all the law does is exempt the 
person with disabilities from expectations applied to those without disabilities, 
tenBroek says, it will be a “cruel hoax,”79 for it will fail to address what 
requirements may be imposed in light of these reduced expectations. Similarly, 
it is a mistake to develop standards simply by analogizing the circumstances of 
people with disabilities to the circumstances of people without disabilities. As an 
example, tenBroek explains how the case law developed by analogizing blind 
people to sighted people in the dark; to see how this analogy fails, all that is 
necessary is to realize that hanging a light will solve the problem for sighted 
people but will do nothing for the blind.80 In calculating the reasonableness of 
risks, tort law must consider how people with disabilities can live in the world 
on the same terms as others in light of the costs of reasonable preventive 
measures, tenBroek famously maintained.81  The right to live in the world, in the 
words of Martha Minow,82 “makes all the difference” in this calculation.   
B. People with Disabilities as Tortfeasors  
tenBroek wrote about how people with disabilities are disfavored when they 
are the victims of accidents. The question posed by people with disabilities using 
automated vehicles is the reverse; here, the person with disabilities is in the 
position of the alleged tortfeasor.  Anecdotally, friends of mine with disabilities 
contend that they are viewed with suspicion when accidents occur, assumed to 
be at fault even when they were rear-ended while completely and properly 
stopped at a red light. Very few legal cases, however, have raised or addressed 
the problem of disability discrimination when persons with disabilities are 
alleged tortfeasors in accidents.   
The few reported decisions suggest that persons with disabilities may be 
held to a standard of care that requires them to consider their disabilities in how 
 
 76. tenBroek, supra note 73 at 848. 
 77. Id. at 865. 
 78. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66 (1927). 
 79. tenBroek, supra note 73 at 866. 
 80. Id. at 869.   
 81. Id. at 881. 
 82. MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND AMERICAN 
LAW (1991). 
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they drive. In Hosmer v. Distler,83 for example, a pedestrian was hit and killed 
by the defendant driver, who wore bifocals and a prosthetic leg.  The court held 
that not only should the driver be held to the standard of a reasonable licensed 
driver, but he also “had the additional responsibility or exercising caution to 
compensate” for hazards increased by his disabilities.84 In Sanders v. Alger,85 a 
caregiver sued a patient for injuries suffered when he helped the patient stand up 
in order to get into a car.  The Arizona court held that the patient, who was 74 
years old and had cerebral palsy, owed his caregiver a special duty of reasonable 
care, which he had violated by not heeding the caregiver’s warnings. The court 
rejected the lower court’s analysis, which had rested on the contention everyone 
owes a duty of care to everyone else, in favor of the more limited view that 
patients have special duties to their caregivers with respect to not engaging in 
conduct creating a risk of physical harm to the caregiver.  
There is also a reported case in which Louisiana was held liable for issuing 
a driver’s license without a medical examination or a driving test to a driver who 
had suffered a stroke and lost some use of his right arm and leg.86 The driver, 
O’Connor, was a resident in a nursing home; a receptionist at the home had called 
the motor vehicle office to alert them to the need to test O’Connor’s driving when 
he renewed his license.87  There was also evidence that O’Connor’s disabilities 
were visible to the driver’s license examiners, as he could not sign the application 
form with his right hand and he limped noticeably.88  The court upheld a trial 
court verdict that the state was negligent in issuing the license and O’Connor was 
negligent in driving.89 
Whether these cases are in conflict with tenBroek’s justifiable insistence on 
the right to live in the world is complex.  On the one hand, it is reasonable to 
expect people with disabilities to be held to a standard of care in which their 
actions do not impose unreasonable risks on others.  This is not a higher standard 
of care; rather, it is a standard of care applied to anyone with knowledge of their 
own special circumstances and capabilities. People who are temporarily on 
medication, for example, are expected to be knowledgeable about the effects of 
their medication on their operation of moving vehicles.90  Their providers, too, 
 
 83. 150 A.D.2d 974, 541 N.Y.S. 2d 650 (3d Dept. 1989). 
 84. 150 A.D.2d at 975. 
 85. 394 P.3d 1083 (Ariz. 2017). 
 86. White v. State, 644 So.2d 684 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1994). 
 87. Id. at 690. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 696. 
 90. See Carolyn Buppert, Am I Liable for the Actions of an Impaired Patient?, MEDSCAPE (Oct. 16, 
2103), https://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/812450 (discussing the responsibility of a clinician to a 
patient when dispensing medications that may cause impairment). 
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are expected to inform them about the risks of impairment from medication.91 
On the other hand, people who experience sudden medical emergencies that they 
could not have anticipated are not negligent.92 If people with disabilities are 
instead, held to a higher standard of care because of their disabilities, this would 
be problematic on the grounds tenBroek alleged. An example would be holding 
people with disabilities strictly liable for injuries they cause as drivers. Another 
example would be holding people with disabilities to a higher safety standard 
than we hold people without disabilities. Instead, the question should be whether 
someone acted reasonably under the circumstances, including the circumstance 
of disability. 
C. Tort Law, Automated Vehicles, and Disabilities 
 Tort scholars have expressed concern over how existing negligence 
standards can clearly apply to automated vehicles in a manner that does not 
unreasonably deter their development and adoption.  In a comprehensive account 
of how existing tort standards may be applied to these vehicles, Mark Geistfeld 
puts forward a number of considerations that could be relevant to the analysis of 
whether a person with disabilities acts reasonably as a user of an automated 
vehicle, although he does not consider people with disabilities as users. These 
considerations all form part of his account of how tort principles can give 
answers to questions about automated vehicles that reduce the uncertainty for 
manufacturers about liability exposure associated with their introduction. 
Geistfeld’s initial analytic point is that automated vehicles feature two 
fundamentally different types of technology:  types that rely on human drivers as 
backups with the associated behavioral factors that this will introduce, and types 
that are fully automated without any driver intervention at all.93 Vehicles of the 
former type function by assisting the driver; they do not, Geistfeld says, 
“fundamentally alter the roles of the driver and vehicle in executing” the driving 
task.94 For these vehicles, drivers will quite literally remain in the liability 
driver’s seat.  However, automation is a matter of degree; as it advances in levels 
to the point at which there is only human intervention when specified 
circumstances arise, it will create novel questions of safety associated with 
drivers. The greatest concern is driver reliance on the automated systems; drivers 
 
 91. Davis v. South Nassau Communities Hosp., 26 N.Y. 3d 563 (N.Y.App. 2015) (hospital had duty 
to warn patient about side effects of medication that could impair a patient’s ability to drive safety); 
Coombes v. Florio, 877 N.E.2d 567 (Mass. 2007) (physician owes a duty of reasonable care to everyone 
foreseeably put at risk by his failure to warn of the side effects of his treatment of a patient). 
 92. See, e.g., Hagenow v. Schmidt, 842 N.W.2d 661 (Iowa 2014), overruled on other grounds, Alcala 
v. Marriott International, Inc., 880 N.W.2d 699 (Iowa 2016). 
 93. Geistfeld, supra note 6, at 14. 
 94. Id. at 17 (quoting Key Considerations in the Development of Driving Automation Systems, CAMP 
AVR CONSORTIUM, (Sept. 2013), http://www-esv.nhtsa.dot.gov/Proceedings/24/files/24ESV-
000451.PDF).  
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may cease to pay attention at all, texting or watching movies, or even sleeping as 
their cars roll along.  One standard response about product safety is that products 
must come with warnings (such as “do not watch movies or sleep when using 
this vehicle as your attention may be required at any time”).  If it can reasonably 
be anticipated, as it surely can, that drivers will regularly ignore these warnings, 
manufacturers may still be liable for defective product design.95  
As an alternative to warnings, some manufacturers are exploring ways of 
addressing such driver inattention with fault-tolerant planning mechanisms to 
ensure that the driver will be alerted of the need to take over the vehicle when 
necessary.96  There is no reason why manufacturers could not explore similar 
mechanisms for drivers whose disabilities may render them incapable of taking 
over their vehicles in the same kinds of circumstances.  Examples would be 
vehicles with sensors to detect dangerously low blood sugar in their diabetic 
users, drowsiness in their users with narcolepsy or sleep apnea, or incipient 
seizures in their users with epilepsy, and then to pull off the road at the next 
available turnoff. These vehicles could be designed to be limited to travel on 
specified routes, such as those in which turnoffs are readily available; or, they 
could come with warnings to their users about what routes are suitable for use. 
Geistfeld describes General Motors’ plans to develop an operating system to 
detect drowsiness, warn the driver, and activate a pull over function when the 
warning is not heeded.97  If they are similarly likely to fall asleep and similarly 
difficult to rouse, there should be no difference between the operation of such a 
system for a person falling into a deep slumber from narcolepsy and a person 
falling into the same slumber from a night spent working the graveyard shift.  If 
the pull off function is sufficiently safe for the latter, it should be sufficiently safe 
for the former, too.  Even if there are differences in risks between these types of 
drowsy drivers, it might still be the case that the riskier drowsy driver with the 
automated system is far safer than conventional drivers today.  Or, it might be 
possible to adjust features of the warning system or routes driven to account for 
the differential driver risks—much as some drivers today receive limited licenses 
while others do not.  These possibilities will press questions about what 
comparisons are appropriate in determining user or manufacturer liability.  In 
addition, in Section III above I suggested that these possibilities may also have 
implications for road designs such as the ready availability of turnoffs. 98 
 
 95. Id. at 20. 
 96. Id.; see generally also Toshiyuki Inagaki & Makoto Itoh, Human’s Overtrust in and Overreliance 
on Advanced Driver Assistance Systems: A Theoretical Framework, INT’L. J. VEHICULAR TECH. (Mar. 24, 
2013) (for a discussion on “a theoretical framework to describe, analyze, and evaluate the driver’s 
overtrust in and overreliance on ADAS.”). 
 97. Geistfeld, supra note 6, 20–21. 
 98. Supra Part III. 
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In theory, safety questions about fully automated vehicles would appear to 
be the same for all users whatever their personal characteristics.  At the time 
when these vehicles appear, therefore, it would seem to follow that no special 
questions would arise about people with disabilities as users of them. In practice, 
it might be difficult to eliminate all user choice, however; even these vehicles 
will need to select destinations and routes, decide who will be passengers, or 
make choices about how the vehicle is to be programmed.99 These are tasks that 
many people with disabilities can perform in a manner comparable to everyone 
else—surely many more people with disabilities than those who are able to drive 
today. 
Indeed, for fully automated vehicles the primary liability is likely to rest 
with the manufacturer.100 Geistfeld suggests that manufacturer liability for such 
vehicles should be handled by premarket testing; he postulates that when 
adequate premarket testing has demonstrated a crash risk half that for 
conventional vehicles, these vehicles could be deemed sufficiently safe for 
marketing.101 Whether this or some higher comparative standard is considered 
sufficient to meet the manufacturer’s tort obligations, the standard adopted 
presses questions of whether people with disabilities as users of automated 
vehicles should be judged to have met their tort obligations when they meet the 
same comparative standard. That is, if people with disabilities as users of 
incompletely automated vehicles are as safe as fully automated vehicles in 
comparison to conventional vehicles, it would violate their right to live in the 
world if they are held to a still higher standard.  
D. Privacy   
The mechanisms by which automated vehicles function raise many privacy 
questions.  To the extent that these vehicles either collect or transmit data in 
electronic form, they are subject to the security risks of any electronic data set. 
They will need to be designed to meet appropriate administrative, physical, and 
technical security standards.102 Some of the information transmitted to and from 
these vehicles will be non-sensitive and publicly available, such as information 
about traffic patterns and the location of safe turnout spaces. Other information 
may raise complex privacy questions, both for users of automated vehicles and 
for others they encounter along the way.  This section considers three privacy 
questions that may be especially important to consider for these vehicles when 
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they are used by people with disabilities:  the possibility that user medical 
information may need to be available for vehicle safety, the collection of 
locational data about the vehicle and its user, and the collection of data by 
manufacturers to improve vehicle performance.  
The communications in which these vehicles are likely to engage make 
these privacy issues especially difficult. Consider the range of likely 
communication channels: between user and automated vehicle, between 
automated vehicle and other vehicles on the road, between automated vehicle 
and information sources such as accident reports or reports of traffic conditions, 
and between the vehicle and the manufacturer. Communication with the user will 
be needed whenever there are override possibilities or whenever the automated 
vehicle supplements rather than supplanting driver functions altogether.  
Communication with other vehicles will aid road coordination.  And 
communication with the manufacturer will be needed for ongoing machine 
learning and feedback to optimize software design—but could also be used to 
permit the manufacturer (which might be liable in tort) to exercise some control 
over vehicle operation including approval of users. The privacy issues raised by 
surveillance technologies are by now well-trodden territory; this section sketches 
briefly whether the availability of information about people with disabilities from 
automated vehicles poses novel questions.  
First, medical information, including information about disability status, 
may be needed both for safety in vehicle design and for safety in vehicle 
operation.103  If an automated vehicle is being programmed for a particular user 
with a disability, the information needed may include the nature of the 
individual’s disability and its likely manifestations.  As the vehicle is operated, 
the frequency and severity of the user’s symptoms may also become apparent.  
Consider, for example, an individual with a seizure disorder who is permitted to 
drive a vehicle that adjusts for the occurrence of a seizure.  Design of this vehicle 
will need to know that the individual has a seizure disorder.  It may also need to 
know about the frequency of onset of seizures and whether there is any advance 
warning of them in order to program safe routes.  As the vehicle is operated, it 
will also collect information about seizure occurrence in real time.   
Sharing this information may benefit the user, as it may allow vehicle 
design that is tailored to the individual’s condition.  It may also demonstrate that 
the individual has been able to drive for considerable periods of time without 
incident.  On the other hand, it may reveal that the individual’s condition is more 
problematic than originally assumed.  
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Under the ADA, employers are entitled to seek medical information to 
determine reasonable accommodations or to make a fitness for duty 
evaluation.104 To seek a fitness for duty evaluation, the employer must have 
objective reason to believe that the employee’s job performance may be impaired 
or that the employee may present a threat to himself or others.105 Information 
may come from observations of the employee on the job or from third parties.106 
Medical information must be limited to the information needed to determine 
whether the employee can safely perform the job in question.107  It must be 
maintained confidentially according to ADA standards.108 If employers have 
both the employee’s electronic health record and the employee’s employment 
records, accessing the health record is accessing the employee’s medical 
information and requires appropriate consent from the employee.109 Whether 
records from an automated vehicle are medical records, how they must be 
maintained, when they may be accessed, and whether they may be used on an 
ongoing basis by the employer to monitor the employee’s job performance are 
surely questions that will arise if employees use automation on the job. At issue 
in answering these questions will be whether collecting this information should 
be considered as ordinary job surveillance, applied to all employees, with 
whatever privacy protections are (or are not) applicable to this surveillance,110 or 
whether any special requirements are being imposed on people with disabilities. 
Under Title II of the ADA, driver’s license authorities are permitted to 
require applicants to produce medical evaluations when there are concerns about 
the ability to drive safely. These evaluations may be requested when someone 
applies for a license, when they renew a license, or if there are conditions on the 
license.111 For example, Oregon requires licensed drivers with seizure disorders 
to report information needed to establish eligibility for licensure at reasonable 
intervals, as determined at the discretion of the state medical officer.112  These 
state laws violate the ADA if they request more information than is needed to 
determine driver performance. States licensing drivers who use automated 
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functions may seek data from the vehicle about user performance; to avoid 
violating the ADA, the information sought must be limited to that needed to 
determine driver safety. 
Vehicle location and performance information may also be needed in a real-
time basis to coordinate the safety of networks of automated vehicles.113 How 
this information may be shared and how long it may be kept will pose difficult 
privacy questions.  Some of the information will enable individuals to be tracked 
across locations, just as the variety of global positioning system data available 
today permits. Many discussions in the literature treat the legal problems that 
attend the collection and utilization of this locational information and other 
similar information gathered by surveillance cameras.114 Locational information 
about autonomous vehicles will, however, add the additional concern that there 
may be incentives to keep it for considerable periods of time in the possibility 
that it might later be needed to establish liability in the case of an accident. 
Finally, manufacturers who seek to continually update software in light of 
how automated vehicles function may seek information from these vehicles. 
They may also seek information to assure that vehicles comply with safety 
warnings to avoid products liability litigation—for example, that cars that are 
programmed to fit particular driver conditions such as sleep apnea or seizure 
disorders are operated in accord with these conditions.115  
CONCLUSION 
Automated vehicles present tremendous possibilities for people with 
disabilities. They also have the potential to open new legal challenges for anti-
discrimination law, tort liability, and privacy considerations. The initial 
discussions of these vehicles have pointed out their potential significance for 
people with disabilities, while largely ignoring what they might mean for 
disability law. This Article sets out first steps on the inviting road ahead for 
people with disabilities as users of automated means of transport. 
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